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Abstract. Differential power analysis (DPA) is a side-channel attack in which
an adversary retrieves cryptographic material by measuring and analyzing the
power consumption of the device on which the cryptographic algorithm under
attack executes. An effective countermeasure against DPA is to mask secrets by
probabilistically encoding them over a set of shares, and to run masked algorithms
that compute on these encodings. Masked algorithms are often expected to provide,
at least, a certain level of probing security.
Leveraging the deep connections between probabilistic information flow and
probing security, we develop a precise, scalable, and fully automated methodology
to verify the probing security of masked algorithms, and generate them from
unprotected descriptions of the algorithm. Our methodology relies on several
contributions of independent interest, including a stronger notion of probing
security that supports compositional reasoning, and a type system for enforcing
an expressive class of probing policies. Finally, we validate our methodology on
examples that go significantly beyond the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
Differential power analysis, or DPA [25], is a class of side-channel attacks in which an
adversary extracts secret data from the power consumption of the device on which a pro-
gram manipulating the data executes. One practical countermeasure against DPA, called
masking [11,22], transforms an algorithm that performs computations over a finite ring
∗ This work appears in the Proceedings of CCS 2016. This is the long version. A preliminary ver-
sion, made public in 2015 under the title “Compositional Verification of Higher-Order Masking:
Application to a Verifying Masking Compiler”, can be found as revision 20150527:192221 of
this report.
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K into a randomized algorithm that manipulates probabilistic encodings.8At an abstract
level, any masking transformation performs two tasks. First, it replaces every algebraic
operation performed by the original algorithm by a call to a gadget, i.e. a probabilistic
algorithm that simulates the behavior of algebraic operations on probabilistic encodings.
Second, it inserts refreshing gadgets, i.e. gadgets that take a probabilistic encoding of
v and rerandomizes its shares in order to produce another probabilistic encoding w of
v. Inserting refreshing gadgets does not change the functional behavior of the masked
algorithm, and increases the randomness complexity and execution time of the masked
program. However, it is also compulsory for achieving security. Therefore, an important
line of research is to find suitable trade-offs that ensure security while minimizing the
performance overhead of masking; see [8] for recent developments in this direction.
The baseline notion of security for masked algorithms is t-probing security. Infor-
mally, an algorithm P is t-probing secure if the values taken by at most t intermediate
variables of P during execution do not leak any information about secrets (held by
its inputs). More formally, an algorithm P achieves t-probing security iff for every
set of at most t intermediate variables, the joint distributions of the values taken by
these intermediate variables coincide for any two executions initiated from initial inputs
that agree on t shares of each input encoding. Stated in this form, probing security is
an instance of probabilistic information flow, universally quantified over all position
sets that meet a cardinality constraint, and is therefore potentially amenable to formal
analysis using a well-developed body of work on language-based security and program
verification. Indeed, the connection between probing security and information flow has
been instrumental in a promising line of research, initiated in [27] and further developed
in [7,20,19,4], which uses type systems, program logics, SMT solvers and other methods
for verifying or synthesizing masked algorithms at small (≤ 5) orders. However, none of
these works addresses the problem of composition, and all fail to scale either to higher
orders or to larger algorithms.
Contributions We develop precise and scalable techniques for synthesizing masked
algorithms that achieve probing security. Our techniques apply to a wide range of
probing policies, including existing policies and new policies defined in this paper, and
deliver masked algorithms that outperform (in terms of randomness complexity and
computational efficiency) prior approaches. In more detail, we make the following broad
contributions:
1. Strong non-interference. We introduce a stronger notion of probing security,
which we call strong non-interference, and prove that it is in fact satisfied by many (but
not all) gadgets from the literature. Furthermore, we justify that strong non-interference
is the desired property for refreshing gadgets, by reconsidering known negative and
positive results [15] for a simplified example extracted from Rivain and Prouff’s inversion
algorithm [31]. We first observe that the refreshing gadget used in the original, flawed,
algorithm does not enjoy strong non-interference. Second, we note that the refreshing
gadget used in the fixed, secure, algorithm is indeed strongly non-interfering, and we
8 A t-encoding of an element v ∈ K is a (t + 1)-tuple v = 〈v0, . . . ,vt〉 such that JvK 4=
v0 ⊕ . . .⊕ vt = v. Each of the vı ∈ K in an encoding v of v is called a share. Moreover, t is
called the masking order. A probabilistic encoding of v is a distribution over encodings of v.
show that one can prove the probing security of the fixed algorithm, based simply on
the assumption that the refreshing gadget is strongly non-interfering. Generalizing these
observations, we prove that every non-interfering algorithm can be turned into a strongly
non-interfering algorithm, by processing its inputs or its output with a strongly non-
interfering refreshing gadget. We also provide more general results about the composition
of strongly non-interfering gadgets.
2. Formal proofs. We develop and implement an automated method, inspired from [4],
for checking strong non-interference. We apply our automated verifier for strong non-
interference to several gadgets from the literature and some other interesting com-
positions, for orders t ≤ 6. For several more widely-used gadgets, we further use
EasyCrypt [5] to provide machine-checked proofs of t-probing security for all t.
3. Type-based enforcement of probing security. We define an expressive language for
specifying a large class of non-interference properties with cardinality constraints. Our
language can be seen as a variant of the first-order theory of finite sets with cardinality
constraints [32,3], and can be used to specify baseline probing security and strong non-
interference, among others. Then, we define a type system that enforces probing policies
and prove its soundness. Furthermore, we show how to model in our language of probing
policies the notion of affine gadget, and we show how it helps improve the precision of
type-checking.
4. Certifying Masking Transformation. As a proof of concept, we implement a
type inference algorithm and a certifying masking transformation that takes as input an
arithmetic expression and returns a masked algorithm typable by our type system.9 Our
transformation improves over prior works by selectively inserting refreshing gadgets
only at points where type-checking would otherwise fail. This strategy leads to improved
efficiency while retaining provable soundness.
5. Practical evaluation. We evaluate our type system and masking transformation on
complete algorithms at various orders, often achieving provable t-probing security levels
far beyond the state-of-the-art for algorithms of those sizes, and with better performance
than most known (provably secure) algorithms in terms of time, memory and randomness
complexity.
Related work Section 9 discusses related work in more detail. Here we focus on recent
work on automated tools for the verification of synthesis of masked algorithms, starting
with Moss et al. [27], who point out and leverage connections between probing security
and probabilistic information-flow for first-order boolean masking schemes. Subsequent
works in this direction accommodate higher-order and arithmetic masking, using type
systems and SMT solvers [7], or model counting and SMT solvers [20,19]. Although
approaches based on model counting are more precise than early approaches based on
type systems and can be extended to higher-order masking schemes, their algorithmic
complexity constrains their applicability. In particular, existing tools based on model
counting can only analyze first or second order masked implementations, and can only
deal with round-reduced versions of the algorithms they consider (for instance, only
9 The cryptography literature often refers to such transformations as masking compilers. We
purposely avoid this terminology, since the terms is used in programming languages for
transformations that output executable code
analyzing a single round of Keccak at order 1, and algorithms for field operations at
orders 2 and higher). Breaking away from model counting, Barthe et al. [4] develop
efficient algorithms for analyzing the security of masked algorithms in the probing
model. Their approach outperforms previous work and can analyze a full block of AES
at first-order, reduced-round (4 rounds) AES at the second-order, and several S-box
computation algorithms masked at the third and fourth orders. However, their work does
not readily scale either to higher orders or to larger algorithms, mainly due to the lack of
composition results.
Our work also bears some connections with language-based security, and in particular
with work on the specification and the enforcement of confidentiality policies using
techniques from programming languages. For instance, our work has similarities with the
work of Pettai and Laud [29], who develop techniques for proving security of multi-party
computations in the presence of strong adversaries, and work by Zdancewic et al. [33],
who propose a compiler that partitions programs for secure distributed execution.
Mathematical preliminaries A function µ : B → R≥0 is a (discrete) distribution over
B if the subset supp(µ) of B with non-zero weight under µ is discrete and moreover∑
b∈supp(µ) µ(b) = 1. We let D(B) denote the set of discrete distributions over B.
Equality of distributions is defined as pointwise equality of functions. Distributions
can be given a monadic structure with the two operators munit(·) and mlet · = ·. For
every b ∈ B, munit(b) is the unique distribution µ such that µ(b) = 1. Moreover, given
µ : D(B) and M : B → D(C), mlet x = µ inM x is the unique distribution µ′ over C
such that µ′(c) =
∑
b µ(b)M(b)(c).
We often use the notion of marginals. The first and second marginals of a distribution
µ ∈ D(B1 ×B2) are the distributions π1(µ) ∈ D(B1) and π2(µ) ∈ D(B2) given by
π1(µ)(b1) =
∑
b2∈B2
µ(b1, b2) π2(µ)(b2) =
∑
b1∈B1
µ(b1, b2).
The notion of marginal readily extends to distributions over finite maps (rather than
pairs).
2 A bird’s eye view of strong non-interference
Before formalizing our definitions, we give an intuitive description of our language for
gadgets and of our security notions, based on simple examples.
Gadgets and Positions Gadget RefreshM2 (Gadget 1) shows the description in our
language of a mask refreshing gadget for t = 2. The gadget takes as input an encoding
variable a ∈ K3, where K is some finite ring and returns a new encoding c ∈ K3
such that JaK = JcK. The gadget first makes local copies of individual input shares aı
(for 0 ≤ ı ≤ 2) of a into local variables cı (for 0 ≤ ı ≤ 2). After this first step, we
sample uniform random elements from K into a local variable r and perform some ring
operations. Finally, the algorithm returns a vector in K3, constructed from the final value
of local variables c0, c1 and c2.
Gadget 1 SNI Mask Refreshing with t = 2
function RefreshM2(a)
c0,0 ← a0; c1,0 ← a1; c2,0 ← a2;
r0
$← K; c0,1 ← c0,0 ⊕ r0; c1,1 ← c1,0 	 r0;
r1
$← K; c0,2 ← c0,1 ⊕ r1; c2,1 ← c2,0 	 r1;
r2
$← K; c1,2 ← c1,1 ⊕ r2; c2,2 ← c2,1 	 r2;
return 〈c0,2, c1,2, c2,2〉
Note that the gadget is written in single static assignment (SSA) form, an intermediate
representation in which each variable is defined exactly once. Having gadgets written in
SSA form allows us to easily refer to the value of a particular variable at a particular point
in the program–simply by referring to its name, which corresponds to a unique definition.
In this paper, we refer to positions in gadgets and algorithms, which correspond exactly
to intermediate variables. We distinguish between three different kinds of positions:
input positions, which correspond to shares of the gadget’s input (here, IRefreshM2 =
{a0,a1,a2}), output positions, which correspond to the variables that appear in the gad-
get’s return vector (here, OintRefreshM2 = {c0,2, c1,2, c2,2}), and internal positions, which
refer to all other positions (here, OextRefreshM2 = {c0,0, c1,0, c2,0, c0,1, c1,1, c2,1, r0, r1, r2}).
Intuitively, this separation allows us to distinguish between direct observations made
by the adversary into a gadget (as internal positions), output shares about which the
adversary may have learned some information by probing gadgets that use them as input
(as output positions), and shares of the gadget’s inputs (as input positions) about which
the adversary is now learning information. In the following, we often write “the joint
distribution of a set of positions” to discuss the joint distribution of the variables defined
at these positions in the gadget (in order). For example, referring to RefreshM2, the
joint distribution of the ordered set O = 〈c0,1, c2,2〉 of positions can be described as the
following function of a, where we use $ to denote a fresh uniform random sample in K
(using indices to denote distinct samples): JRefreshM2KO(a)
4
= 〈a0⊕$0, (a2	$1)	$2〉.
Probing Security and Non-Interference The RefreshM2 gadget is known to be 2-probing
secure, or 2-non-interfering (2-NI) in our terminology, in the sense that the joint distribu-
tion of any set of at most 2 of its positions, corresponding to adversary probes, depends
on at most 2 shares of the gadget’s inputs. This guarantees, if the input encoding is
uniform, that no information about it leaks through any 2 probes in the circuit.
Considering again the set O = 〈c0,1, c2,2〉 of positions in RefreshM2 and its distri-
bution JRefreshM2KO, it is easy to see–purely syntactically–that it depends at most on
shares a0 and a2 of the gadget’s input encoding. Similarly considering all possible pairs
of positions, we can prove that each of them has a joint distribution that depends on at
most two shares of a.
Strong Non-Interference Probing security is generally not composable: combining t-
probing secure gadgets does not necessarily yield a t-probing secure algorithm [15].
Our main contribution is a new and stronger notion of security for gadgets, which we
dub strong non-interference (or SNI), which does support some compositional reason-
ing. SNI reinforces probing security by requiring that the number of input shares on
which the distribution of a given position set may depend be determined only by the
number of internal positions present in that set. For example, consider again position
set O = 〈c0,1, c2,2〉 in RefreshM2, and note that it contains only one internal position
(c0,1). We have seen that the joint distribution JRefreshM2KO of that position set syn-
tactically depends on two shares of a. However, it can be equivalently expressed as
JRefreshM2KO(a) = 〈$0, (a2 	 $1) 	 $2〉 (since the ring addition ⊕ is a bijection of
each of its arguments and $0 is a fresh and uniform ring element). This shows that the
distribution in fact depends on at most one share of a (here a2). In fact, it can be shown
that RefreshM2 is 2-SNI. More generally, surprisingly many gadgets from the literature
achieve SNI.
However, and not unexpectedly, some gadgets from the literature do not satisfy SNI.
Consider for instance RefreshA2 (Gadget 2). It is easy to see that the gadget is 2-NI
(each position cı, depends only on input share aı, and each position ri is completely
independent from the input encoding). Still, looking at position set O′ = 〈c0,1, c1,1〉,
which is composed of one internal position and one external one, we see that the
distribution JRefreshA2KO′
4
= 〈a0 ⊕ $0,a1 ⊕ $0〉 does depend on more than one share
of a. RefreshA2 is therefore not 2-SNI.
Gadget 2 NI Mask Refreshing with t = 2
function RefreshA2(a)
c0,0 ← a0; c1,0 ← a1; c2,0 ← a2;
r0
$← K; c0,1 ← c0,0 ⊕ r0; c1,1 ← c1,0 	 r0;
r1
$← K; c0,2 ← c0,1 ⊕ r1; c2,1 ← c2,0 	 r1;
return 〈c0,2, c1,1, c2,1〉
Compositional Probing Security This small difference between NI and SNI has a
significant effect on security when used in larger circuits. Indeed, the output positions
of a strongly non-interfering gadgets do not depend on any of its input positions: when
considered independently from internal positions (in the absence of internal probes), their
distribution is uniform; and in the presence of internal probes, their joint distribution is
entirely determined by that of the probed internal positions. This is essential in supporting
compositional reasoning about the probing security of larger algorithms. In particular,
this makes algorithms of the form shown in Algorithm 3 (for some gadgets R and G of
the appropriate types that work on 2-encodings) easy to prove t-NI if R is RefreshM2,
and illustrates why composition might fail if R is instantiated with RefreshA2. A key
observation to make is that an adversary that observes 2 positions internal to G may learn
2 shares of both a and b. If R is instantiated with RefreshA2 (and is thus only 2-probing
secure), the 2 shares of b can be used to infer information about 2 further shares of a,
which may give the adversary full knowledge of all 3 shares of a. On the other hand, if
R is instantiated with RefreshM2 (and is thus 2-SNI), the adversary’s knowledge of 2
shares of b does not propagate any further back to a, and the algorithm remains secure.
Alg. 3 An abstract algorithm
function Alg2(a)
b := R(a);
c := G(a,b);
return c
Broader uses of SNI The notion of strong non-interference, and the masking transforma-
tion we define here have already found applications in follow-up work. Belaı̈d et al. [8]
prove using our compositional techniques that their new non-interfering multiplication
can be securely combined with the strongly non-interfering one of Rivain and Prouff [31]
to build a strongly non-interfering AES S-box with reduced randomness complexity.
Similarly, Goudarzi and Rivain [23] use our method to ensure the compositional security
of their bitsliced software implementation of AES. Battistelo et al. [6] use and prove
t-SNI for their O(n · log n) mask refreshing gadget, allowing further randomness com-
plexity reductions without loss of probing security. Coron et al. [16] use and prove t-SNI
for their efficient parallel algorithms for the evaluation of SBoxes.
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 formalizes our two-tier
language for masked gadgets and algorithms, the notion of position, and their seman-
tics, as well as the joint distribution of a set of positions. Sections 4, and 5 formalize
probing security as t-non-interference, and formally define our new notion of t-strong-
non-interference before illustrating it more generally with simple examples. In Section 6,
we define a language to describe probing policies, and define a simple type system
for enforcing probing policies of algorithms, formalizing and generalizing the simple
compositional arguments outlined here. In Section 7, we present an automated method to
verify the strong non-interference of arbitrary gadgets at small fixed orders, that follows
the approach used above in arguing that RefreshM2 is 2-SNI, and adapts algorithms by
Barthe et al. [4] to reduce the number of position sets to consider. In Section 8, we extend
our type system into a masking transformation which automatically builds a masked algo-
rithm from an unprotected program, carefully choosing the proper locations for strongly
non-interfering refreshing gadgets. We evaluate on full cryptographic algorithms the
performance of the type system, of the resulting transformation, and of the transformed
algorithms. Section 9 discusses related work on leakage models, composition for probing
security, and other masking transformations. We interleave discussions of interesting
leads for future work.
3 Masked algorithms
The formal development of this paper is based on a minimalist 2-tier language.10 The
lower tier models gagdets as sequences of probabilistic and (three-address code) deter-
10 However, the verification tool supports richer settings to which the theory extends smoothly
and our examples are written in a more general language, closer to our implementation, that
supports static for loops, direct assignments to shares (aı ← e), arbitrary expressions on the
right-hand side of assignments, and a broader return syntax. For example, Gadget 4 shows
generic descriptions of the mask refreshing algorithms from Section 2.
algorithm P (a1, . . . ,an) ::= s; return a
alg. body s ::= b :=` G(a1, . . . ,an) gadget call.
| s; s call seq.
gadget G(a1, . . . ,an) ::= c; return #»x
gadget body c ::= x $← K prob. assign.
| x← e det. assign.
| c; c assign. seq.
expressions e ::= x, y, . . . variable
| aı ıth-share of a
| x ? y ring operation
Fig. 1: Syntax of masked algorithms
ministic assignments, whereas the upper tier models algorithms as sequences of gadget
calls (we assume that each gadget call is tagged with its instruction number ` ∈ N). The
formal definition of the language is given in Figure 1, where we use vector notations ( #»x ,
. . . ) to denote (t+ 1)-tuples of scalar variables, ı to denote indices (such that 0 ≤ ı ≤ t)
in such a tuple or in encoding variables, and exponents ·ı to denote the projection of
a component out of a (t + 1)-tuple (for example aı, or #»x ı). We require gadgets and
algorithms to be well-formed, in the following sense. A gadget G is well-formed if
its body is in SSA form, i.e. its scalar variables appear at most once on the left-hand
side of an assignment. An algorithm P is well-formed if all its gadgets are defined and
well-formed, and if, in all gadget calls b := G(a1, . . . ,an), variables b,a1, . . . ,ak are
pairwise disjoint.
We now turn to the semantics of gadgets and algorithms. Crucially, the semantics
of gadgets and algorithms is instrumented to keep track of the joint distribution of all
intermediate values computed during execution. Formally, we assume that scalar and
encoding variables take values in K and Kt+1, where K is the carrier set of a finite ring
(K, 0, 1,⊕,	,). We let Val = Kt+1 denote the set of encoded values. Furthermore,
we let A denote the set of encoding variables and define the set of global memories
as Mem = A → Kt+1. Likewise, we let V denote the set of scalar variables and
define the set of local memories as LMem = V ⇀ K and extended local memories as
ELMem = (N×V)⇀ K. Then, the semantics of a gagdet G is a function JGK that takes
as input a global memory and returns a distribution over pairs of local memories and
values. Likewise, the semantics of an algorithm P is a function JP K that takes as input a
global memory and returns a distribution over extended local memories and values. The
semantics is outlined in Figure 2.
In order to define probing security, we first define a notion of position that corre-
sponds to the intuition illustrated in Section 2. First, we define the set I 4= {aı | a ∈
A, 0 ≤ ı ≤ t} of input positions (these correspond to shares of encodings used in the
gadget or algorithm), the set O 4= I ∪ V of positions (composed of input positions and
scalara variables) and the set O+ 4= I ∪ (N × V) of extended positions (where scalar
variables are tagged with a label in N to differentiate between uses of a variable in
different gadgets). The input positions of a gadget G and of an algorithm P are denoted
by IG and IP respectively and contain exactly those elements of I that correspond to
encoding variables that occur in G or P . Likewise, the set of positions of a gadget G and
of an algorithm P are denoted by OG ⊆ O and OP ⊆ O+ respectively and consist of all
positions that occur in a gadget G, and all extended positions that occur in an algorithm
P .
To capture the joint distribution of a set of positions O in a gadget G or an algorithm
P (with O ⊆ OG, resp. O ⊆ OP ), we take the marginal of the gadget or algorithm’s
semantics with respect to O. These are denoted by JGKO : Mem → D(O → K) and
JP KO : Mem→ D(O → K) respectively.11
JeK(m, lm) : K
with m ∈ Mem and lm ∈ LMem
JxK(m, lm) = lm(x)
JaıK(m, lm) = m(a)ı
Jx ? yK(m, lm) = lm(x) ? lm(y)
JcK(m, lm) : D(Mem× LMem)
with m ∈ Mem and lm ∈ LMem
Jx← eK(m, lm) = munit(m, lm{x← JeK(m, lm)})
Jx $← KK(m, lm) = mlet v = UK in munit(m, lm{x← v})
Jc1; c2K(m, lm) = mlet (m1, lm1) = Jc1K(m, lm) in Jc2K(m1, lm1)
JGK(m) : D(LMem× Val)
with m ∈ Mem and
G(a1, . . . ,an) ::= c; return
#»x
JGK(m) = mlet (m1, lm1) = JcK(m, ∅) in munit(lm1, lm1( #»x ))
JsK(m, elm) : D(Mem× ELMem)
with m ∈ Mem, elm ∈ ELMem and
G(a1, . . . ,an) ::= c; return
#»x
Jb :=` G(c1, . . . , cn)K(m, elm) = mlet (lm1, v) = JGK(m{(ai)1≤i≤n ← (m(ci))1≤i≤n})
in munit(m{b← v}, elm ] elm1)
where elm1 is the map that sets only
elm1(`, v) = lm(v) for all v ∈ dom(lm)
Js1; s2K(m, elm) = mlet (m1, elm1) = Js1K(m, elm) in Js2K(m1, elm1)
JP K(m) : D(ELMem× Val)
with m ∈ Mem and P (a1, . . . ,an ::= s; return b
JP K(m) = mlet (m1, elm1) = JsK(m, ∅) in munit(elm1,m1(b))
where m{x1, . . . , xn ← v1, . . . , vn} denotes the map m where xi is updated with vi for each i
in increasing order, and ] denotes the disjoint union of partial maps.
Fig. 2: Semantics of gadgets and algorithms
11 In order to justify that the marginals have the required type, observe that one can refine the type
of JGK given in Figure 2 to Mem→ D(Val× (OG → K)). Similarly, one can refine the type
of JP K to Mem→ D(Val× (OP → K)) .
4 Baseline probing security
We first review the basic notion of probabilistic non-interference and state some of its
key properties. As usual, we start by introducing a notion of equivalence on memories.
Definition 1 Let G be a gadget, and let I ⊆ IG. Two memories m,m′ ∈ Mem are
I-equivalent, written m ∼I m′, whenever m(a)ı = m′(a)ı for every aı ∈ I.
Next, we define probabilistic non-interference.
Definition 2 Let G be a gadget, and let I ⊆ IG and O ⊆ OG. G is (I,O)-non-
interfering (or (I,O)-NI), iff JGKO(m) = JGKO(m′) for every m,m′ ∈ Mem s.t.
m ∼I m′.
For every gadget G and every position set O, we define the dependency set of O as
depsetG(O) =
⋂
{ I | G is (I,O)-NI }; thus, depsetG(O) is the smallest set I ⊆ IG
such that G is (I,O)-NI.
Lemma 1 LetG be a gadget andO ⊆ OG be a set of positions inG.G is (depsetG(O),O)-
NI.
Proof (sketch). It suffices to show that there exists I such that G is (I,O)-NI and that
for every I and I ′, if G is (I,O)-NI and (I ′,O)-NI, then it is also (I ∩ I ′,O)-NI. ut
We conclude this section by providing an alternative definition of non-interference, in
the style of simulation-based security.
Lemma 2 A gadget G is (I,O)-NI iff there exists a simulator Sim ∈ (I → K) →
D(O → K) such that for every m ∈ Mem,
JGKO(m) = Sim(m|I)
where m|I is the restriction of m to elements in I.
Proof. For the direct implication, define S as follows: given a function m ∈ I → K, we
let S be JGKO(m′), where m′ is any memory that extends m. It is immediate to check
that S satisfies the expected property. The reverse direction is immediate.
This observation is useful to connect the information-flow based formulation of probing
security introduced below with the simulation-based formulations of probing security
often used by cryptographers. Indeed, the dependency set depsetG(O) can be interpreted
as a set of G’s input shares that is sufficient to perfectly simulate the joint distribution of
positions in O to an adversary.
Next we define our baseline notion of probing security, which we call t-non-
interference, and state some of its basic properties. The notion of t-non-interference is
based on the notion of degree of an input set, which we define first. Given an input set I
and an encoding variable a, we define the set I|a
4
= I ∩ a of positions in I that corre-
spond to shares of a. Further, we define the degree of an input set I as ‖I‖ 4= maxa |I|a|
(where | · | is the standard notion of cardinality on finite sets). This notion captures the
intuition that the adversary should not learn all shares of any single encoding variable, by
bounding the information an adversary may learn about any of a gadget’s shared inputs
through positions probed internally to that gadget.
Definition 3 (Probing security) A gadget G is t-non-interfering (or t-NI) whenever
‖depsetG(O)‖ ≤ |O| for every O ⊆ OG such that |O| ≤ t.
The next lemma establishes that t-NI is already achieved under a weaker cardinality
constraint on the dependency set. Variants of Lemma 3 in simulation-based settings
appear in [10,8].
Lemma 3 A gadget G is t-NI iff ‖depsetG(O)‖ ≤ t for every O ⊆ OG s.t. |O| ≤ t.
Proof. The direct implication follows from transitivity of ≤. The reverse implication
proceeds by induction on k = t − |O|. The case k = 0 is immediate by definition of
t-NI. For the inductive case, let O be such that t− |O| = k + 1. Let a be an encoding
variable such that |depset(O)|a| = ‖depset(O)‖. Since ‖depset(O)‖ ≤ |O| ≤ t, there
necessarily exists an input position aı such that aı /∈ depset(O). LetO′ = O∪{aı}. We
have ‖depsetG(O′)‖ ≤ |O′| = 1 + |O| by induction hypothesis and ‖depsetG(O′)‖ =
1 + ‖depsetG(O)‖ by construction, therefore we can conclude. ut
The notion of t-non-interference extends readily to algorithms. In addition, one can
prove that an algorithm is secure iff the gadget obtained by fully inlining the algorithm
is secure.
Lemma 4 A program P is t-NI iff the gadget inline(P ) obtained by full inlining is t-NI.
The lemma sheds some intuition on the definition of t-NI for algorithms. However, we
emphasize that verifying fully inlined algorithms is a bad strategy; in fact, previous work
indicates that this approach does not scale, and that composition results are needed.
5 Strong Non-Interference
We introduce strong non-interference, a reinforcement of probing security based on
a finer analysis of cardinality constraints for dependency sets. Informally, strong non-
interference distinguishes between internal and output positions, and requires that the
dependency set of a position set O has degree ≤ k, i.e. contains at most k shares of
each encoding input, where k is the number of internal positions in O. Formally, a local
variable is an output position for G if it appears in the return tuple of G, and an internal
position otherwise. Let Oint (resp. Oext) denote the subset of internal (resp. output)
positions of a set O. Strong t-non-interference requires that the degree of depset(O) is
smaller than |Oint|, rather than |O|. Intuitively, a t-SNI gadget information-theoretically
hides dependencies between each of its inputs and its outputs, even in the presence of
internal probes. This essential property is what supports compositional reasoning.
Definition 4 (Strong probing security) A gadget G is t-strongly non-interfering (or
t-SNI) if ‖depsetG(O)‖ ≤ |Oint| for every position set O such that |O| ≤ t.
Fortunately, many gadgets from the literature achieve strong non-interference (see
Table 1 and Section 7). First, we note that gadget RefreshM (Gadget 4b) generalized
from Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24] is t-SNI for all t. (A proof sketch for this proposition
is given in Appendix C.)
Gadget 4 Mask Refreshing Gadgets
0: function RefreshA(a)
1: c0 ← a0
2: for i = 1 to t do
3: r $← K
4: c0 ← c0 ⊕ r
5: ci ← ai 	 r
6: return c
(4a) Addition-Based Mask Refreshing
0: function RefreshM(a)
1: for i = 0 to t do
2: ci ← ai
3: for i = 0 to t do
4: for j = i+ 1 to t do
5: r $← K
6: ci ← ci ⊕ r
7: cj ← cj 	 r
8: return c
(4b) Multiplication-Based Mask Refreshing
Proposition 1 RefreshM (Gadget 4b) is t-SNI.
On the contrary, the additive refreshing gadget RefreshA (Gadget 4a) achieves NI
but fails to achieve SNI. Interestingly, Coron’s linear-space variant of Ishai, Sahai and
Wagner’s multiplication [12, Alg. 6] (Gadget 7) and the MultLin gadget for securely
multiplying linearly dependent inputs [15, Alg. 5] (Gadget 8) are both strongly non-
interfering. The proof of SNI for Gadget 7 is easy to adapt to the more standard quadratic-
space multiplication gadget, since they compute the same intermediate values in different
orders.
Proposition 2 The SecMult gadget (Gadget 7) is t-SNI.
Proposition 3 The MultLin gadget (Gadget 8) is t-SNI.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 have been machine-checked using Easy-
Crypt [5]. We also provide more detailed game-based proof sketches in the full version
of this paper.
Strong Non-Interference for Mask Refreshing We now show how choosing a t-SNI
refreshing gadget over a t-NI refreshing gadget critically influences the security of
algorithms. Concretely, we provide a separating example, which captures the essence of
the flaw in the inversion algorithm of Rivain and Prouff [31]. The example considers two
algorithms (Algorithm 5) which compute a cube in GF(28) by squaring and multiplying
(using, for illustration purposes, some t-NI gadgets Square and Mult for squaring and
multiplication). Both algorithms use a refreshing gadget between the two operations, but
they differ in which gadget they use: BadCube (Gadget 5a) uses the additive refreshing
gagdet RefreshA, which is t-NI but not t-SNI, and Cube (Gadget 5b) uses the RefreshM
gadget, which is t-SNI. This simple difference is fundamental for the security of the two
algorithms.
Alg. 5 Cubing procedures (with K = GF(28))
function BadCube(x)
y1 := Square(x)
y2 := RefreshA(y1)
z := Mult(x,y2)
return z
(5a) Insecure Cubing
function Cube(x)
y1 := Square(x)
y2 := RefreshM(y1)
z := Mult(x,y2)
return z
(5b) Secure Cubing
Lemma 5 ([15]) BadCube is not t-NI for any t ≥ 2. Cube is t-NI for all t.
Coron et al. [15] exhibit proofs for both statements. In Appendix C, we give a compact
proof of t-NI for Cube that does not exhaustively consider all (t+ 1)-tuples of positions
in Cube. The key argument is that RefreshM being t-SNI essentially renders useless
any information on y2 the adversary may have learned from observing positions in Mult:
those do not add any shares of y1 to the dependency set we compute for RefreshM, and
therefore do not influence the shares of x that appear in the final dependency set for
Cube. On the other hand, using a simple t-NI mask refreshing gadget (such as RefreshA)
in its place breaks the proof by allowing us to deduce only that each position in the
multiplication may depend on 2 shares of x.
In Section 6, we show how the proof of Lemma 5 can be improved and extended into
a compositional proof for the (repaired) inversion algorithm of Rivain and Prouff [31],
and, in fact, outlines a general mehodology for proving algorithms t-NI or t-SNI.
A Generic Composition Result Before formalizing and automating this proof process
to obtain precise probing security proofs for large circuits, we now give a coarse but
simple composition result that illustrates the generality of SNI. Informally, an algorithm
is t-NI if all its gadgets verify t-NI and every non-linear usage of an encoding variable is
guarded by t-SNI refreshing gadgets. In addition, it shows that processing all inputs, or
the output of a t-NI algorithm with a t-SNI gadget (here RefreshM) suffices to make the
algorithm t-SNI.
Proposition 4 An algorithm P is t-NI provided all its gadgets are t-NI, and all encoding
variables are used at most once as argument of a gadget call other than RefreshM.
Moreover P is t-SNI if it is t-NI and one of the following holds:
– its return expression is b and its last instruction is of the form b := RefreshM(a);
– its sequence of encoding parameters is (a1, . . . ,an), its ith instruction is b :=i
RefreshM(ai) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ai is not used anywhere else in the algorithm.
6 Enforcing probing policies
We first define an expressive assertion language for specifying sets of position sets, and
then introduce probing policies, which yield a convenient formalism for defining a large
class of information flow policies with cardinality constraints.
Definition 5 (Probing policy)
1. A probing assertion is a pair (Γ, φ), where Γ is a map from encoding variables
to expressions in the theory of finite sets, and φ is a cardinality constraint. Each
probing assertion (Γ, φ) defines a set of subsets of positions for a fixed algorithm P ,
denoted by J(Γ, φ)K. (The syntax and semantics of set expressions and cardinality
constraints is explained below.)
2. A probing policy is a pair of assertions
(Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout)
where (Γout, φout) is the post-assertion and (Γin, φin) is the pre-assertion.
3. AlgorithmP satisfies the policy (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout), writtenP |= (Γin, φin)⇐=
(Γout, φout), if for every position set O ∈ J(Γout, φout)K, P is (I,O)-NI for some
input position set I ∈ J(Γin, φin)K.
The syntax of set expressions and cardinality constraints is given by the following
grammar:
(set expr.) S := X | ∅ | S ∪ S
(arith. expr.) l := |S| | |O`| | t | l + l
(cardinality constr.) φ := l ≤ l | φ ∧ φ
The syntax distinguishes between variables X that are drawn from a set X of names–that
we will use to represent sets of shares of an encoding variable, and variablesO, annotated
with a label `, that are drawn from a disjoint set Ω of names–that we will use to represent
sets of internal positions probed in the gadget used at instruction `.
Remark 1 Our syntax for set expressions and constraints is a fragment of the (decidable)
theory of finite sets with cardinality constraints. It would be possible to include other
set-theoretical operations, as in [32,3]. However, we have found our core fragment
sufficient for our purposes.
The semantics of assertions is defined using the notion of valuation. A valuation µ is a
mapping from names in X and Ω to finite sets, such that ∀X ∈ X . µ(X) ⊆ {0, . . . , t}
and ∀O` ∈ Ω. µ(O`) ⊆ OG` , where G` is the gadget called at instruction `. Every
valuation µ defines, for every set expression S, a set of share indices µ(S) ⊆ {0, . . . , t}
and for every arithmetic expression l an interpretation µ(l) ∈ N, using the intended
interpetation of symbols (i.e. ∪ is interpreted as set union, + is interpreted as addition,
. . . ).
Definition 6 (Interpretation of assertions)
1. µ satisfies a cardinality constraint φ, written µ |= φ, if µ(l1) ≤ µ(l2) for every
conjunct l1 ≤ l2 of φ.
2. The interpretation of Γ under µ is the set
µ(Γ ) =
⋃
a
{aı | ı ∈ µ(Γ (a))} ∪
⋃
O
µ(O)
3. The interpretation of (Γ, φ) is the set
J(Γ, φ)K = {µ(Γ ) | µ |= φ}
We now turn to the definition of the type system.
Definition 7 AlgorithmP (a1, . . . ,an) ::= s; return r has type (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout)
if the judgment ` s : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout) is derivable using the typing rules from
Figure 3. We denote this fact ` P : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout).
We briefly comment on the rules. Rule (SEQ) is used for typing the sequential composition
of gadget calls and is as expected. The remaining rules are used for interpreting the
non-interference properties of gadgets. We now detail them.
` b := G(a1, . . . ,an) : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γ, φ) ` c : (Γ, φ)⇐= (Γout, φout)
` b := G(a1, . . . ,an); c : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout)
(SEQ)
G is t-NI φout ⇒ |Γout(b)|+ |O`| ≤ t
Γin := Γout{b, (ak)1≤k≤n ← ∅, (Γout(ak) ∪X`k)1≤k≤n}
` b :=` G(a1, . . . ,an) : (Γin, φout ∧ (
∧
1≤k≤n
|X`k| ≤ |Γout(b)|+ |O`|))⇐= (Γout, φout)
(NI-GADGET)
G is t-SNI φout ⇒ |Γout(b)|+ |O`| ≤ t
Γin := Γout{b, (ak)1≤k≤n ← ∅, (Γout(ak) ∪X`k)1≤k≤n}
` b :=` G(a1, . . . ,an) : (Γin, φout ∧ (
∧
1≤k≤n
|X`k| ≤ |O`|))⇐= (Γout, φout)
(SNI-GADGET)
G is affine Γin := Γout{b, (ak)1≤k≤n ← ∅, (Γout(ak) ∪ Γout(b) ∪X`)1≤k≤n}
` b :=` G(a1, . . . ,an) : (Γin, φout ∧ |X`| ≤ |O`|)⇐= (Γout, φout)
(AFFINE)
where Γ{∀ k. vk ← ∀ k. ek} stands for the map Γ where each vk is updated to map to ek and all
other indices are left untouched.
Fig. 3: Typing rules
Rule (SNI-GADGET) is used for typing calls to a SNI-gadget with an arbitrary
post-assertion and a pre-assertion in which the mapping Γout is updated to reflect the
dependencies created by the call, and the constraint is strenghtened with the cardinality
constraint imposed by strong non-interference. The rule has a side condition |O`| +
|Γout(b)| ≤ t ensuring that the total number of positions whose dependency set by G
we are considering is bounded by t, where O` is the name of the subset of positions
that are observed in the current gadget (called at line `), and Γout(b) is the set of shares
of b the adversary has information about from positions probed in gadgets that use
b later on in the algorithm. This side condition is verified under the condition φout.
Note that the variables X`k are fresh, and annotated with the label ` that identifies the
current instruction, and an indice k that identifies the argument. Rule (NI-GADGET)
is similar but deals with NI-gadgets, and therefore extends Γin with correspondingly
weaker constraints on the X`k.
We now turn to the rule for affine gadgets. Informally, we say that a gadget is affine if
it manipulates its input encodings share by share; this includes standard implementations
of ring addition, for example, but also of many other functions that are linear in K (for
example, multiplication by a constant–or public–scalar, or shifts in the representation
when addition is bitwise). Formally, we say that a gadgetG with parameters (a1, . . . ,an)
is affine iff there exists a family of procedures f0, . . . , ft such that G is an inlining of
x0 ← f0(a01, . . . ,a0n); . . . ;xt ← ft(at1, . . . ,atn);
return 〈x0, . . . , xt〉;
Thus, one can define a mapping η : OG → {0, . . . , t} such that for every position
π ∈ OG, η(π) = ı if π occurs in the computation of the ıth share (i.e. in the computation
of fı(aı1, . . . , a
ı
n)). The fine-grained information about dependencies given by this notion
of affinity is often critical to proving the probing security of algorithms. Therefore, it
is important to capture affinity in our type system. Let O = Oint ] Oext be a position
set, split between internal and output positions. The affine property ensures that the joint
distribution of O depends only on input positions in η(Oint ∪ Oext), and furthermore
that |η(Oint ∪ Oext)| = |η(Oint)| + |η(Oext)| = |η(Oint)| + |Oext|. Rule (AFFINE)
interprets this affine property into our type system, using Γout(b) and a fresh O` for
Oext and Oint, respectively, and encoding η(O`) into an abstract existential set X`. The
condition |X`| ≤ |O`| precisely captures the fact that |η(O)| ≤ |O| for all O.
Definition 8 (Typing of an algorithm) Let P be an algorithm with a definition of the
form P (a1, . . . ,an) ::= s; return r.
P is well-typed for NI, written `NI P , whenever there exist Γin, φin such that
` P : (Γin, φin) ⇐= (∅,
∑
1≤`≤|P | |O`| ≤ t) and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, φin ⇒
|Γin(ai)| ≤ t.
P is well-typed for SNI, written `SNI P , whenever there exist Γin, φin such that
` P : (Γin, φin)⇐= ([r← O], |O|+
∑
1≤`≤|P | |O`| ≤ t) and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we have φin ⇒ |Γin(ai)| ≤
∑
1≤`≤|P | |O`| (where [v ← x] is the map that associates x
to v and is everywhere else undefined).
When typing for NI, we start from the empty map for Γout and simply consider any
output position observed as if they were internal. However, the same cannot be done
when typing for SNI since we need to distinguish clearly between internal positions in
one of the O`, used to type the gadget at instruction `, and output positions in O, initially
used as the set of position of the algorithm’s return encoding.
Proposition 5 (Soundness of the Type System)
If ` s : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout) then also |= P : (Γin, φin)⇐= (Γout, φout)
If `NI P then P is t-NI
If `SNI P then P is t-SNI
An Example: Rivain and Prouff’s inversion algorithm We now illustrate the type system
by describing a typing derivation on Rivain and Prouff’s algorithm for computing
inversion in GF(28) [31,15]. An algorithm implementing this operation securely is
shown in Figure 4, with some information relevant to its typing derivation. We recall
that the function x 7→ x2n is linear (for any n) in binary fields and rely on affine gadgets
pow2, pow4, and pow16 to compute the corresponding functionalities.
We present the typing derivation in the slightly unusual form of a table, in Figure 4,
which shows the code of the inversion algorithm along with the values of Γin and φin (φin
shows only the part of the constraint that is added at that program point, not the entire
constraint) at each program point. By the sequence rule, these serve as Γout and φout
for the immediately preceding program point. The table also shows the side conditions
checked during the application of gadget rules where relevant. It is easier to understand
the type-checking process by reading the table from the bottom up.
As per the definition of well-typedness for SNI, we start from a state where the
output position set O is associated to the algorithm’s return encoding r5, and where the
constraint contains only the global constraint that the whole position set O ∪
⋃
`O
` is of
cardinality bounded by t. When treating line 9, we know that SecMult is t-SNI and try
to apply rule (SNI-GADGET). We check that the number of positions observed in this
instance of SecMult is bounded by t (which trivially follows from the global constraint),
and construct the new value of (Γin, φin) following the rule: since neither of the call’s
input encodings are used below, new sets X91 and X
9
2 are associated to the call’s inputs
and the SNI constraints are added to φin. Applying the rules further until the top of the
program is reached, and performing the appropriate set unions in Γ when an encoding
variable is used more than once, we observe that the resulting pre-assertion is such that
|Γin(a)| ≤ |O1|+ |O2|+ |O3|+ |O9| ≤
∑
`O
`, and therefore proves that this inversion
algorithm is t-SNI.
Γin φin Instructions Side conditions
function invert(a)
a :X32 ∪X92 ∪X21 ∪X1 |X1| ≤ |O1| z1 :=1 pow2(a)
a :X32 ; z1 :X
9
2 ∪X21 |X21 | ≤ |O2| z2 :=2 Refresh(z1) |X31 |+ |O2| ≤ t
a :X32 ; z1 :X
9
2 ; z2 :X
3
1 |X3k | ≤ |O3| r1 :=3 SecMult(z2,a) |X61 ∪X82 ∪X51 ∪X4|+ |O3| ≤ t
z1 :X
9
2 ; r1 :X
6
1 ∪X82 ∪X51 ∪X4 |X4| ≤ |O4| w1:=4 pow4(r1)
z1 :X
9
2 ; r1 :X
6
1 ; w1 :X
8
2 ∪X51 |X51 | ≤ |O5| w2:=5 Refresh(w1) |X62 |+ |O5| ≤ t
z1 :X
9
2 ; r1 :X
6
1 ; w1 :X
8
2 ; w2 :X
6
2 |X6k | ≤ |O6| r2 :=6 SecMult(r1,w2) |X81 ∪X7|+ |O6| ≤ t
z1 :X
9
2 ; w1 :X
8
2 ; r2 :X
8
1 ∪X7 |X7| ≤ |O7| r3 :=7 pow16(r2)
z1 :X
9
2 ; w1 :X
8
2 ; r3 :X
8
1 |X8k | ≤ |O8| r4 :=8 SecMult(r3,w1) |X91 |+ |O8| ≤ t
z1 :X
9
2 ; r4 :X
9
1 |X9k | ≤ |O9| r5 :=9 SecMult(r4, z1) |O|+ |O9| ≤ t
r5 :O |O|+
∑
1≤`≤9 |O
`| ≤ t return r5
Fig. 4: a−1 in GF(28)
Finally, one can remark that the instances of SecMult at line 6 and 8 do not in fact
need to be t-SNI. As pointed out by Belaı̈d et al. [8], using a t-NI multiplication gadget
at these program points is sufficient to construct a type derivation for SNI.
7 SNI Checker for Gadgets
We present an automated method for proving that gadgets (or small algorithms, by
inlining) are t-SNI at small fixed orders (up to t = 6 for ring multiplication). We then
give some experimental results.
Verification algorithm We adapt to t-SNI the algorithmic contributions of Barthe et
al. [4] that support the automated verification, on small to medium gadgets and for small
orders, of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner’s circuit privacy property [24], which is similar to our
t-NI. Their work builds on two observations: first, every probabilistic program P taking
input x and performing a (statically) bounded number (say q) of uniform samplings over
K is equivalent, in the sense below, to composing a deterministic program P † taking
inputs x and r with random sampling over Kq . Formally, for every x,
JP K(x) = mlet r = UKq in JP †KO(x, r)
Second, P satisfies (I,O)-NI iff there exists a function f such that for every x1, x2 and
r, such that x1 ∼I x2
JP †KO(x1, r) = JP †KO(x2, f(x2, r))
and moreover f(x, ·) is a bijection for every x. The latter equality can be easily verified
for all x and r using standard tools, therefore the key to proving non-interference is to
exhibit a suitable function f . Their algorithm proceeds by incrementally defining bijec-
tions f1, . . . , fn satisfying the two conditions above until evenutally JP †KO(x, fn(x, r))
can be rewritten into an expression that does not depend syntactically on secrets.
However, even with efficient algorithms to prove that a program P is (I,O)-NI for
some position set O, proving that P is t-NI remains a complex task: indeed this involves
proving (I,O)-NI for all O with |O| ≤ t. Simply enumerating all possible position
sets quickly becomes untractable as P and t grow. Therefore, [4] uses the following
fact: if P is (I,O′)-NI then it is also (I,O)-NI for all O ⊆ O′. Hence, checking that P
is (I,O′)-NI for some large set O′ is sufficient to prove that P is (I,O)-NI for every
O ⊆ O′, and this using only one proof of non-interference. In particular, they exhibit
algorithms that rely on the explicit construction of the bijection fn to efficiently extend
the set O from which it was constructed into a potentially much larger set O′ for which
that bijection still proves (I,O′)-NI. Further, they also exhibit algorithms that rely on
such extensions to prove the existence of I such that (I,O)-NI for all position sets O
much more efficiently than by considering all position sets individually.
We adapt their algorithms by changing the core bijection-finding algorithm in two
ways: i. rather than being applied to a modified program that includes the initial uniform
sampling of secret encodings, our core algorithm works directly on the gadget description
(this is necessary to ensure that we prove t-SNI instead of alternative security notions);
and ii. our search for a bijection stops when JP †KO(x, fn(x, r)) can be simplified into
an expression that syntactically depends on at most d shares of the secret (for the desired
bound d on ‖I‖, that is d = |Oint| for SNI), rather than stopping when all syntactic
dependencies on the secret input have been removed. We note that replacing the bound d
from the second point with d = t yields a verification algorithm for t-NI (by Lemma 3).
Our full algorithm is given in App. B.
Evaluation We evaluate the performance of our SNI verifier on some medium and small
gadgets: SecMult, Coron’s linear-memory ring multiplication algorithm [12, Alg. 6];
MultLin, Coron et al.’s algorithm for the computation of functionalities of the form
x g(x) for some linear g [15, Alg. 5]; Add, the standard affine gadget for the addition
Gadget
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Order 6
1-SNI Time 2-SNI Time 3-SNI Time 4-SNI Time 5-SNI Time 6-SNI Time
SecMult 3 0.07s 3 0.08s 3 0.09s 3 0.86s 3 36.40s 3 37min
MultLin 3 0.07s 3 0.08s 3 0.15s 3 1.19s 3 54.13s 3 48min
RefreshA 3 0.07s 7 0.08s 7 0.08s – – – – – –
RefreshIter2 3 0.08s 3 0.08s 3 0.08s 3 0.08s 3 0.13s 7 .20s
RefreshIter3 – – 3 0.09s 3 0.08s 3 0.09s 3 0.14s 3 .54s
WeakMult 3 0.07s 7 0.07s 7 0.09s – – – – – –
Table 1: Experimental Results for the SNI Verifier
of two encodings; RefreshA, the weakly secure mask refreshing algorithm from Rivain
and Prouff [31]; RefreshIterk, the iterated additive refresh proposed by Coron [12, Alg. 4]
for supporting more efficient composition in his full model (we make explicit the number
of iterations k); WeakMult, the generic reduced-randomness multiplication algorithm
proposed by Belaı̈d et al. [8]. Table 1 sums up our findings and some verification
statistics.
8 Masking Transformation
As a proof of concept, we implement our type system for a comfortable subset of C that
includes basic operators, static for loops, table lookups at public indices, and mutable
secret state, and extended with libraries that implement core gadgets for some choices of
K. Moreover, we define a source-to-source certifying masking transformation, which
takes an unprotected program and returns a masked algorithm accepted by our type
system, selectively inserting refreshing gadgets as required for typing to succeed. We
note that the transformation itself need not be trusted, since its result is the final program
on which typing is performed.
Furthermore, the choice of C as a supporting language is for convenience, since
many of the algorithms we consider have reference implementations written in C. In
particular, we do not claim that compiling and executing the C programs produced by
our masking transformation will automatically yield secure executables: our verification
results are on algorithms described in the C language rather than on C programs in
general. Making use of these verification results in practice still requires to take into
account details not taken into account in the probing model. Although an important
problem, this is out of the scope of this paper and a research area on its own: for example
Balasch et al. [2] consider some of the issues involved in securely implementing probing
secure algorithms.
8.1 Implementation
We now give an overview of the different passes performed by our masking transforma-
tion. The input programs use explicit typing annotations to distinguish public variables
(for example, public inputs, or public loop indices) from sensitive or secret variables
that must be encoded. We call public type any type outside of those used for denoting
variables that must be encoded.
Parsing and Pre-Typing This pass parses C code into our internal representation, checks
that the program is within the supported subset of C, performs C type-checking and
checks that variables marked as sensitive (variables given type K) are never implicitly
cast to public types. Implicit casts from public types to K (when compatible, for example,
when casting a public uint8 t to a protected variable in GF(28)) are replaced with
public encoding gadgets (that set one share to the public value and all other shares to 0).
Gadget Selection and Generic Optimizations This pass heuristically selects optimal
gadgets depending on their usage. For example, multiplication of a secret by a public
value can be computed by an affine gadget that multiplies each share of the secret,
whereas the multiplication of two secrets must be performed using the SecMult gadget.
Further efforts in formally proving precise types for specialized core gadgets may
also improve this optimization step. Since the encoding replaces scalar-typed variables
(passed by value) with array-typed variables (passed by reference), it is also necessary
to slightly transform the program to ensure the correctness of the resulting program. In
addition, we also transform the input program into a form that more closely follows the
abstract language from Figure 1, which makes it easier to type-check.
Type Inference and Refresh Insertion This is the core of our transformation. We imple-
ment a type inference algorithm for the type system of Section 6. The algorithm simplifies
policies on the fly, supports inferred types on sub-algorithms as gadget-invocation types,
and fails when the simplified policy is inconsistent. Failure arises exactly when a refresh-
ing operation is needed. At the cost of tracking some more information and reinforcing
the typing constraint on sub-algorithms, we use this observation to automatically insert
Refresh gadgets where required. When type inference fails, the variable whose masks
need to be refreshed is duplicated and one of its uses is replaced with the refreshed
duplicate. To avoid having to re-type the entire program after insertion of a refresh
gadget, our transformation keeps track of typing information for each program point
already traversed and simply rewinds the typing to the program point immediately after
the modification.
Code Generation Finally, once all necessary mask refreshing operations have been
inserted and the program has been type-checked, we produce a masked C program. This
transformation is almost a one-to-one mapping from the instructions in the type-checked
programs to calls to a library of verified core gadgets or to newly defined gadgets. Some
cleanup is performed on loops to clarify the final code whenever possible, and to remove
initialization code on normalized gadgets. Interestingly, our transformation produces
a (set of) C files that is parameterized by the masking order t. Producing executable
versions of that algorithm at a particular order, for example to evaluate its performance,
is as easy as defining a pre-processor macro at compile-time.
8.2 Practical Evaluation
To test the effectiveness of our transformation, we apply it to different algorithms,
generating equivalent masked algorithms at various orders. We apply our transformation
to the following programs: AES (), a full computation (10 rounds including key
schedule) of AES-128 masked using the multiplication gadget, and implemented in
GF(28); AES (x  g(x)), a full computation (10 rounds including key schedule) of
AES-128 masked using Coron et al.’s gadget for computing x g(x), and implemented
in GF(28); Keccak, a full computation (24 rounds) of Keccak-f[1600], implemented
in GF(264); Simon, a block of Simon(128,128), implemented in GF(264); Speck, a
block of Speck(128,128), implemented in GF(2)64, and using one of the following
modular addition algorithms; AddLin, Coron, Großschädl and Vadnala’s algorithm [14]
for the computation of modular addition on boolean-masked variables (in GF(2)64);
AddLog, Coron et al.’s improved algorithm [13] for the computation of modular addition
on boolean-masked variables (in GF(2)64). We first discuss the performance of our
verifier and the verification results before discussing the practical significance, in terms
of time, memory and randomness complexity of our masking transformation. Finally,
we discuss examples on which our tool implementation could be improved.
Verification Performance and Results Table 2 shows resource usage statistics for gener-
ating the masked algorithms (at any order) from unprotected implementations of each
algorithm. The table shows the number of mask refreshing operations inserted in the
program12, the compilation time, and the memory consumption. For Keccak, we show
two separate sets of figures: the first, marked “no refresh”, is produced by running our
algorithm transformer on a bare implementation of the algorithm; the second, marked
“refresh in χ”, is produced by running our tool on an annotated implementation, where
a mask refreshing operation is manually inserted in the χ function and the tool used
for verification only. We discuss discrepancies between the numbers on these two lines
in Section 9, and consider the “refresh in χ” set of statistics in all discussions until
then. We first note the significant improvements these results represent over the state
of the art in formal verification for probing security. Indeed, our closest competitor [4]
report the verification of all 10 rounds of AES (including key schedule) at order 1 in
10 minutes, and could not verify all 10 rounds for higher orders. In contrast, our tool
verifies the probing security of Rivain and Prouff’s algorithm [31] as fixed by Coron et
al. [15] at all orders in less than a second.13 Further, we note that the masked algorithms
our transformation produce for modular addition are the first such algorithms known
to be t-probing secure using only t+ 1 shares. Indeed, the original proofs [14,13] rely
on the ISW framework and make use of 2t+ 1 shares to obtain t-probing security. We
further note that Coron, Großschädl and Vadnala’s algorithm [14] does not require the
insertion of mask refreshing operations, and is thus t-probing secure with t+ 1 shares
as it was originally described. Finally, we note that, to the best of our knowledge, the
12 Note that the number of mask refreshing operations executed during an execution of the
algorithm may be much greater, since the sub-procedure in which the insertion occurs may be
called multiple times.
13 This excludes the once-and-forall cost of proving the security of core gadgets.
results obtained on Keccak, Simon and Speck constitute the first generic higher-order
masking schemes for these algorithms.
Algorithm # Refresh Time Mem.
AES () 2 per round 0.09s 4MB
AES (x g(x)) 0 0.05s 4MB
AddLin 0 0.01s 4MB
AddLog log2(k)− 1 0.01s 4MB
Keccak (no refresh) 1 per round ∼20min 23GB
Keccak (refresh in χ) 0 18.20s 456MB
Simon 67 per round 0.38s 15MB
Speck (AddLin) 61 per round 0.35s 38MB
Speck (AddLog) 66 per round 0.21s 8MB
Table 2: Resource usage during masking and verification
Performance of Masked Algorithms Table 3 reports the time taken to execute the resulting
programs 10,000 times at various orders on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 0 @
2.90GHz with 64GB of memory running Linux (Fedora). As an additional test to assess
the performance of the generated algorithms at very high orders, we masked an AES
computation at order 100: computation took ∼0.11 seconds per block. For AES and
Speck, the figures shown in the “unmasked” column are execution times for the input to
our transformation: a table-based implementation of AES or an implementation of Speck
that uses machine arithmetic, rather than Coron, Großschädl and Vadnala’s algorithm
would be much faster, but cannot be masked directly using our transformation. Although
these observations do highlight the cost of security, we note that using RefreshA when
masking the AES SBox does not incur a significant timing gain for any of the masking
orders we tested (t ≤ 20). However, the randomness cost is greatly reduced, which may
be significant in hardware or embedded software settings. Further research in reducing
the randomness cost of SNI mask refreshing, or of other gadgets, serves to make security
less costly [8,1,6]. We also confirm the 15% timing improvements reported by Coron et
al. [15] when implementing the AES SBox using their gadget for computing x g(x).
Algorithm unmasked Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 5 Order 10 Order 15 Order 20
AES () 0.078s 2.697s 3.326s 4.516s 8.161s 21.318s 38.007s 59.567s
AES (x g(x)) 0.078s 2.278s 3.209s 4.368s 7.707s 17.875s 32.552s 50.588s
Keccak 0.238s 1.572s 3.057s 5.801s 13.505s 42.764s 92.476s 156.050s
Simon 0.053s 0.279s 0.526s 0.873s 1.782s 6.136s 11.551s 20.140s
Speck (AddLin) 0.022s 4.361s 10.281s 20.053s 47.389s 231.423s 357.153s 603.261s
Speck (AddLog) 0.022s 0.529s 1.231s 2.258s 5.621 19.991s 42.032 72.358s
Table 3: Time taken by 10,000 executions of each program at various masking orders
We now look more closely at statistics for the modular addition algorithms AddLin
and AddLog and their effects on the performance of masked algorithms for Speck. We
first note that proving AddLog t-NI requires the addition of a mask refreshing gadget,
whereas AddLin does not. Despite this additional cost, however, AddLog is better than
AddLin when word size k grows, since it saves k − log(k) multiplications and replaces
them with a single mask refreshing operation. These performance gains on modular
addition become overwhelming when seen in the context of a masked algorithm for
Speck, which computes one 64-bit modular addition per round. It would be interesting to
consider using our transformer to produce masked algorithms for other efficient circuits
for modular addition [26] and measure their performance impact in terms of randomness,
time and memory when masked.
9 Discussions and Related Work
Here, we further discuss the relation between the definitions and results reported here
and existing and future work in theoretical and practical cryptography. Our discussions
focus mainly on: i. adversary and leakage models; ii. compositional security notions;
iii. theoretical and practical masking transformations; and iv. limitations of our definitions
and tools.
Adversary and Leakage Models for Masking We have considered security in the probing
model of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24], which is particularly well-suited to automated
analysis due to its tight relation to probabilistic non-interference. In particular, our notion
of t-NI is equivalent to the notions of t-probing security and perfect t-probing security
used by Carlet et al. [10] and others [31,15].
Despite its broad usage in the literature, the practical relevance of the probing
model is not immediately obvious: in practice, side-channel adversaries observe leakage
traces, which contain noisy information about all intermediate computations, rather than
precise information about some. This threat model is much more closely captured by the
noisy leakage model, first introduced by Chari et al. [11] and extended by Prouff and
Rivain [30]. The noisy leakage model is much more complex and makes security proofs
on masked algorithms significantly more involved, and much harder to verify.
Duc, Dziembowski and Faust [17] show that proving probing security allows one to
estimate the practical (noisy leakage) security of a masked algorithm. While Duc, Faust
and Standaert [18] empirically show that some of the factors of Duc et al.’s bound [17]
are likely proof artefacts, the remainder of the bound, and in particular a factor that
includes the size of the circuit, seems to be tight. Intuitively, Duc et al. [18] essentially
show that the probing security order gives an indication of the smallest order moment of
the distribution over leakage traces that contains information about the secret, whereas
the size of the circuit the adversary can probe is an indicator of how easy it is to evaluate
higher-order moments.
Composition, and Region and Stateful Probing This observation makes clear the impor-
tance of also considering more powerful probing adversaries that may place t probes
in each of some (pre-determined) regions of an algorithm (the t-region probing model).
For example, each core gadget (field operations and mask refreshing operation) could
be marked off as a separate region (as in [17]). More recently, and in work contempo-
rary with that presented here, Andrychowicz, Dziembowski and Faust [1] consider a
more general notion of region whose size must be linear in the security parameter (and
masking order), and exhibit a mask refreshing gadget that is linear in size and fulfills, in
the probing model, the reconstructibility and re-randomization properties from Faust et
al. [21]. We now discuss the implications of reconstructibility and re-randomization, and
their relation to our notion of SNI, based on the similarity of Prop. 4 with Ishai et al.’s
remark on “Re-randomized outputs” [24], before discussing the applicability of SNI to
security in the region and stateful probing models [24].
Intuitively, a gadget is t-reconstructible whenever any t of its positions can be
simulated using only its (shared) inputs and outputs, and a gadget is re-randomizing
whenever its output encoding is uniform and t-wise independent even if its input encoding
is completely known. Our SNI notions combines both considerations. Formulating it
in similar terms, a gadget is t-SNI whenever any t of its positions can be simulated
using only its (shared) inputs, and if its output encoding is uniform and (t − d)-wise
independent even if d shares of each of its inputs are known (for all d such that 0 ≤ d < t).
Expressed in this way, it is clear that SNI is slightly weaker than “reconstructible and
re-randomizable” in the probing model. This allows us to automatically verify that a
gadget is SNI for some fixed t, whereas reconstructibility and re-randomization are more
complex. In addition, the ability to combine the use of SNI and weaker (NI or affine)
gadgets in a fine-grained way allows us to more precisely verify the security of large
algorithms in models where the adversary can place t probes in the entire algorithm.
We leave a formal investigation of the relation between SNI and “reconstructibility and
re-randomization” as future work.
Based on reconstructibility and re-randomization, Faust et al. [21,1] prove elegant
and powerful composition results that in fact apply in the more powerful region probing
and stateful probing models [24], where the adversary may (adaptively) place t probes
in each region (or in each subsequent iteration) of the algorithm. It is worth noting
that our SNI notion also enables composition in these two models: indeed, it is easy to
see that any two 2t-SNI algorithms (our regions) can be composed securely when the
adversary can place t probes in each of them. Further, our composition techniques also
support elegant constructions that support compositional security proofs in the region
and stateful probing models without doubling the number of shares computations are
carried out on (instead, simply doubling the number of shares at region boundaries). We
give details of these robust composition results in Appendix D. Depending on the size
of regions that are considered, these robust composition results may bring significant
performance gains in terms of randomness and time complexity.
Finally, our notion of SNI and the automated verification techniques presented allow
the efficient, precise and automated verification of t-SNI inside each region, an issue
which is not addressed by the works of Faust et al. [21,1].
Existing Masking Transformations Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24] and others [17,1] also
propose simple masking transformations that turn unprotected algorithms (or boolean or
arithmetic circuits) into protected masked algorithms. Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24] forgo
the use of mask refreshing gadgets by doubling the number of shares on which masked
computations occur–with a quadratic impact on performance and randomness complexity.
Faust et al. [17,1] rely on making sure that all gadgets used in the masked algorithm
are reconstructible and re-randomizing. This guarantees security in a stronger probing
model, but incurs an even greater loss of performance. By contrast, our transformation
attempts to decide whether a mask refreshing operation is required to ensure security in
the probing model, and our core contributions (the notion of SNI and the type-checker)
do support composition in stronger probing models, whilst still allowing the proofs of
security within regions to be handled precisely.
Coron [12] proposes schemes for masking lookups at secret or sensitive indices
in public tables. We have not investigated whether or not the proposed algorithms are
SNI or simply NI, and whether or not establishing these properties can be done by
adapting our type-system or if it should be done in a different way (either as a direct
proof or using the checker from Section 7). We note in passing that part of the result by
Coron [12], namely that using RefreshIter2t+12t between each query to the masked S-box
supports security in the stateful probing model is subsumed and improved by the robust
composition results described in the full version.
The security analysis of masking schemes in the t-probing model is connected to
techniques from multi-party computation, exploited in parallel lines of research by
threshold implementations [28,9]. In particular, higher-order threshold implementations
are exposed to similar security issues due to composition, although they offer additional
protection against practical considerations not captured in standard probing models,
namely glitches. We believe that the results discussed here are in fact applicable to
the compositional security analysis of threshold implementations but leave a formal
investigation of these links as future work.
Refining SNI We now discuss some limitations of our current implementation, and leads
for future theoretical work that may yield significant practical improvements.
Alg. 6 Semi Public Modular Addition in GF(2)k
function AddPub(x, y)
w := x y
a := x⊕ y
u := w 1
for i = 2 to k − 1 do
a′ := RefreshM(a)
ua := u a′
u := ua⊕w
u := u 1
z := a⊕ u
return z
(6a) Masked algorithm produced by our tool
function AddPub(x, y)
w := x y
a := x⊕ y
w := RefreshM(w)
u := w 1
for i = 2 to k − 1 do
ua := u a
u := ua⊕w
u := u 1
z := a⊕ u
return z
(6b) Masked algorithm produced by hand
The first point we wish to discuss is the case of Keccak, for which algorithm trans-
formation is prohibitively expensive. This issue is due to our handling of static for loops:
indeed, our tool unrolls them to perform type-checking and rolls them back up afterwards
if possible (otherwise leaving them unrolled in the final algorithm). For smaller algo-
rithms, this is not a problem, but unrolling all 24 rounds of Keccak-f, along with all the
loops internal to each iteration, yields a very large program that is then backtracked over
each time a mask refreshing operation is inserted. Refining our non-interference notions
to multi-output gadgets and algorithms would allow us to significantly improve our tool’s
handling of loops and high-level composition, whilst gaining a better understanding of
probing security in such scenarios. This improved understanding may in turn help inform
the design of primitives that are easier to protect against higher-order probing.
Second, we discuss our greedy policy for the insertion of mask refreshing algorithms.
In our experiments, we consider a version of the linear-time modular addition algo-
rithm [14] whose second argument is a public (non-shared) value (for example, a round
counter, as in Speck). We show its code, as produced by our masking transformer, in
Gadget 6a, and display a hand-masked variant in Gadget 6b, slightly abusing notations
by denoting simple gadgets with the symbol typically used for their unprotected versions.
Notice that the variable w is used once per loop iteration, and that our tool refreshes
each of them, while it is sufficient to mask only the first one. Improving our gadget
selection algorithm to detect and implement this optimization—and others—would be
an interesting avenue for future work, that could help improve our understanding of the
effect on security of compiler optimizations.
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A Code for Gadgets Listed in the Paper
Gadget 7 Masked multiplication [12]
0: function SecMult(a,b)
1: for i = 0 to t do
2: ci ← ai  bi /* line 2i */
3: for i = 0 to t do
4: for j = i+ 1 to t do
5: r $← K /* line 5i,j */
6: ci ← ci 	 r /* line 6i,j */
7: t← ai  bj /* line 7i,j */
8: r ← r ⊕ t /* line 8i,j */
9: t← aj  bi /* line 9i,j */
10: r ← r⊕ t /* line 10i,j */
11: cj ← cj ⊕ r /* line 11i,j */
12: return c
Gadget 8 Masked multiplication between linearly dependent inputs with linear function
g [15]
0: function MultLin(a)
1: for i = 0 to t do
2: ci ← ai  g(ai) /* line 2i */
3: for i = 0 to t do
4: for j = i+ 1 to t do
5: r $← K /* line 5i,j */
6: r′ $← K /* line 6i,j */
7: ci ← ci 	 r /* line 7i,j */
8: t← ai ⊗ g(r′)⊕ r /* line 8i,j */
9: t← t⊕ (r′ ⊗ g(ai)) /* line 9i,j */
10: t← t⊕ (ai ⊗ g(aj 	 r′) /* line 10i,j */
11: t← t⊕ ((aj 	 r′)⊗ g(ai)) /* line 11i,j */
12: cj ← cj ⊕ t /* line 12i,j */
13: return c
B SNI Verification Algorithm
We now give a full description of our algorithm for the verification of SNI properties.
Apart from notation changes, the algorithms are only slightly adapted from [4]. In
particular, the proof of correctness for Algorithm 11 can be easily generalized from that
given in [4].
In the following, we consider gadgets whose encoded inputs are all secret and
denoted as a set of encodings {xı}ı. Given a core gadget, the set of all possible positions
in that gadget can be represented as a set E of K expressions over the xik and some
random variables inR (corresponding to the random samplings occurring in the gadget).
All algorithms in this subsection consider gadgets represented in this form. Given such a
set E, we denote with var(E) the set of all variables that appear in E, and with Eint and
Eout the subsets that correspond to internal and output positions, respectively.
Following Barthe et al. [4], our algorithm relies, at its core, on exhibiting an isomor-
phism between the distribution of each acceptable set of positions and some distribution
that is syntactically non-interfering. In this case, we consider all sets of positions that
are composed of ti internal positions and to output positions (for any ti and to such
that ti + to ≤ t) and find a bijection with some distribution that depends on at most
ti shares of each of the gadget’s inputs. Algorithm 9 takes an integer d and a set E
of expressions over the xik and random variables in R and finds, when successful, a
sequence of substitutions
#»
h that construct a bijection between the distribution described
by E and a distribution that syntactically depends on at most d shares of each one of the
xi.
Algorithm 9 Given O, d, find I such that ‖I‖ ≤ d for (I,O)-NI
1: function NId{xı}ı (E)
2: if ∀ı, |var(E) ∩ xı| ≤ d then
3: return DEGREE(d)
4: (E′, e, r)← choose({(E′, e, r) | e is invertible in r ∧ r ∈ R ∧ E = E′[e/r]})
5: if (E′, e, r) 6= ⊥ then
6: return OPT(e, r) : NId{xı}ı(E
′)
7: return ⊥
The fact that Algorithm 9 produces a witness sequence of substitutions can be
leveraged, as in [4], to extend the position set E on which the corresponding bijection
still proves the desired property. Algorithms 10a and 10b leverage this, and are only
lightly adapted (for notation) from Barthe et al. [4]. An important thing to note is that
extendd{xı}ı(X,E,
#»
h ) always returns a set X ′ of expressions such that X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ E
and such that X ′ depends (by
#»
h ) on at most d shares of each one of the xi.
Finally, we adapt the second space-covering algorithm proposed by Barthe et al. [4]
to the verification of the t-SNI property, by taking care to call NId with the value of d
that corresponds to the number of internal positions being considered. Algorithm 11
shows the adapted algorithm for the core verification task, and Algorithms 12a and 12b
show the instances used to verify that a gadget is t-SNI and t-NI, respectively. Here
again, Algorithm 11 is only lightly adapted from [4] and their correctness proof, which
establishes that whatever property is checked by NId is true for all sets in
⋃
j Pdj (Ej),
also applies to the new property being verified. It is then easy to prove that the calls
to checkd made by checkt-SNI and checkt-NI are sufficient to establish t-SNI and t-NI
respectively (relying on Lemma 3 for t-NI).
Algorithm 10 Auxiliary algorithms for SNI verification
function recheckd{xı}ı (E,
#»
h )
if
#»
h = [DEGREE(d)] then
return ∀ı, |var(E) ∩ xı| ≤ d
if
#»
h = OPT(e, r) :
#»
h′ then
(E′)← choose({E′ | E = E′[e/r]})
if E′ 6= ⊥ then
return recheckd{xı}ı(E
′,
#»
h ′)
else
return false
(10a) Rechecking a derivation
function extendd{xı}ı (X,E,
#»
h )
e← choose(E)
if e 6= ⊥ then
if recheckd{xı}ı(e,
#»
h ) then
return extendd{xı}ı((X, e), E \ {e},
#»
h )
else return extendd{xı}ı(X,E \ {e},
#»
h )
else return X
(10b) Extending the Position Set
Algorithm 11 Core Algorithm for (I,O)-NI Verification
1: function checkd{xı}ı ({(dj , Ej)}j)
2: if ∀j, dj ≤ |Ej | then
3: Yj ← choose(Pdj (Ej))
4:
#»
h ← NId{xı}ı(
⋃
j Yj)
5: if
#»
h = ⊥ then raise CannotProve (
⋃
j Yj)
6: Ŷj ← extend{xı}ı(Yj , Ej \ Yj ,
#»
h )
7: checkd{xı}ı({(dj , Ej \ Ŷj)}j)
8: for j; 0 < ij < dj do
9: checkd{xı}ı({(ij , Ŷj), (dj − ij , Ej \ Ŷj)})
10: return true
Algorithm 12 Algorithms for t-SNI and t-NI verification
1: function checkt-SNI{xı}ı (E)
2: for i; 0 ≤ i ≤ t do
3: checki{xı}ı({(i, Eint), (t− i, Eout)})
4: return true
(12a) t-SNI Verification
1: function checkt-NI{xı}ı (E)
2: checkt{xı}ı({(t, E)})
3: return true
(12b) t-NI Verification
We also note that Algorithm 11 can be used in other ways, not shown in Algorithm 12,
that would enforce other, perhaps more complex, probing policies. We do not claim
that all probing policies could be easily verified in this manner (and in fact, the affine
policy could not), and leave as future work an investigation of efficient (or semi-efficient)
algorithms–in this style–for the verification of arbitrary probing.
C Proofs
In this Appendix, we give proofs for lemmas, theorems, and propositions whose proof is
not given in the paper, and detail some of the proof sketches.
Proof (sketch for Proposition 1). Leveraging the equivalence between simulation and
non-interference (Lemma 2), we prove t-SNI by constructing a simulator that uses at
most |Oint| shares of the gadget’s input to perfectly simulate the joint distribution of
any position set O such that |O| ≤ t. The constructed simulator is very similar to those
previously used in proofs of t-NI.
Let O be a set of positions such that |O| ≤ t, and let d1 = |Oint| and d2 = |Oext|.
Note that d1 + d2 ≤ t. Our goals are: i. to find an input set I such that ‖I‖ ≤ d1, ii. to
construct a perfect simulator that uses only input shares ai ∈ I.
First, we identify which variables are internal (and therefore will be considered
in Oint) and which are outputs (in Oext). Internals are the ai, the ri,j (the value of r
sampled at iteration i, j), and the ci,j (resp. cj,i) which correspond to the value of the
variable ci (resp. cj) at iteration i, j of the second loop. Outputs are the final values of
ci (i.e. ci,t). Then, we define I as follows: for each position among ai, ri,j and ci,j
(with j < t) we add share ai to I. It is clear that I contains at most d1 positions, since
each internal position adds at most one position to I. We now construct the simulator.
For clarity, observe that the RefreshM algorithm can be represented using the following
matrix, observing that ci,j is the partial sum of the first j + 2 elements of line i.
a0 0 r0,1 r0,2 · · · r0,t
a1 	 r0,1 0 r1,2 · · · r1,t
a2 	r0,2 	r1,2 0 · · · r2,t
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ad 	 r0,t 	 r1,t 	r2,t · · · 0
 .
For each ı0 such that aı0 ∈ I (that is, for each line ı0 of the matrix that contains at least
one observed internal value), aı0 is provided to the simulator (by definition of I). Thus,
the simulator can sample all rı0,j and compute all partial sums cı0,j and the ı0
th output
normally. At this point, all values (all internals and all outputs) on lines indexed by an ı
with aı ∈ I follow the same distribution as they would in the real computation and are
therefore perfectly simulated.
It remains to simulate output shares c when a /∈ I. Remark that simulating the
ıth line as above also necessarily fixes the value of all random variables appearing in
the ıth column. After internal positions are simulated, at most d1 lines of the matrix
are fully filled. Therefore, each line  with a /∈ I contains at least t− d1 ≥ d2 holes
corresponding to random values that have not yet been fixed. For each of the output
position made on one such line , we can therefore pick a different r,k that we choose
so c can be simulated by a freshly sampled uniform value.
Proof (sketch for Lemma 5). [15] exhibit proofs for both statements. We now sketch a
proof of t-NI for Cube that does not exhaustively consider all (t+ 1)-tuples of positions
in Cube, emphasizing the critical use of strong non-interference for the refreshing gadget.
Recall that our goal is to upper-bound ‖depsetCube(O)‖ for all O ⊆ OCube such that
|O| ≤ t. Given such a set, we first partition it as O 4= OM ] OR ] OS following gadget
boundaries (recall that positions in algorithms include the label of the gadget invocation
they occur in). First, we consider the dependency set IM
4
= depsetMult(OM) of OM by
Mult. We know |OM| ≤ |O| ≤ t, and by t-NI of Mult, we deduce that ‖IM‖ ≤ |OM|.
Considering now the invocation of RefreshM, we must establish cardinality properties of
the dependency set IR
4
= depsetRefreshM(OR ∪ IM|y2) of those direct internal positions
observed by the adversary in RefreshM, jointly with those output positions she may
have learned information about through positions probed in later parts of the circuit
(here, in Mult). From previous inequalities, we know that |IM|y2 | ≤ ‖IM‖ ≤ |OM|,
and thus we have |OR ∪ IM|y2 | ≤ t. By t-SNI of RefreshM, we thus have ‖IR‖ ≤
|OR| (since positions in IM|y2 are external to RefreshM). Finally, we consider the
dependency set IS
4
= depsetSquare(OS ∪ IR|y1) of direct internal positions observed
by the adversary in Square, jointly with those output positions she may have learned
information about through positions probed in later parts of the circuit (here in RefreshM
and Mult, propagated through the single use of y1 in the invocation of RefreshM). Since
we have |OS ∪ IR|y1 | ≤ |OS|+ ‖IR‖ ≤ |OS|+ |OR| ≤ t, and since Square is t-NI, we
conclude that ‖IS‖ ≤ |OS| + |OR|. Overall, we have depsetCube(O) ⊆ IS|x ∪ IM|x,
and we can conclude (using some of the intermediate inequalities from above), that
‖depsetCube(O)‖ ≤ |OS|+ |OR|+ |OM| ≤ t.
C.1 Game-Based Proofs for SNI Gadgets
In this appendix, we give detailed proofs for Propositions 1 to 2.
Multiplication-Based Refreshing (Prop. 1) Following the proof sketch for Proposi-
tion 1, we give here a more detailed proof sketch, based on a sequence of games, that
more closely follows the EasyCrypt formalization of the proof. This is only meant to
illustrate the additional effort involved in obtaining formal proofs of such results, rather
than convince the reader of the validity of the proof. The proof scripts can be obtained
from the authors. The formal proof is done by constructing a simulator (R3) and formally
verifying its equivalence with an explicitly leaky version of the gadget (R0).
function RefreshM(a) :
for i = 0 to t do ci ← ai;
for i = 0 to t do
for j = i+ 1 to t do
ri,j ← $;
ci ← ci ⊕ ri,j ;
cj ← cj 	 ri,j ;
return c
Game 0. For clarity, we start, in Game 0, from
the original refreshing gadget RefreshM, which
computes the t+1 shares ci of the gadget’s output
without leaking any intermediate observations. We
recall its definition on the right.
function R0(a,O) :
for i = 0 to t do ci ← ai;
if (ai ∈ O) then ai ← ai;
for i = 0 to t do
for j = i+ 1 to t do
ri,j ← $;
if (ri,j ∈ O) then ri,j ← ri,j ;
ci ← ci ⊕ ri,j ;
if (ci,j ∈ O) then ci,j ← ci;
cj ← cj 	 ri,j ;
if (cj,i ∈ O) then cj,i ← cj ;
for i = 0 to t do
if (ci ∈ O) then ci ← ci;
return c;
Game 1. In Game 1, we make the leakage explicit
by taking as additional input from the adversary a
set of observations, whose values are written, dur-
ing execution, into a table visible to the adversary.
We refer to this function as R0 (shown left).
As explained in the proof sketch above, we distin-
guish three different kinds of internal observations
ai, ri,j , ci,j and have the final definitions of ci as
output observations. Considering this first game,
we define the set IO as a function of Oint, as:
IO = {i | ai ∈ O}
∪ {i | ∃j.ri,j ∈ O}
∪ {i | ∃j.ci,j ∈ O}
function SumCij(i, j) :
s← ai;
for k = 0 to j do
if (i < k) then
s← s⊕ ri,k;
elseif (i > k) then
s← s	 rk,i;
return s;
Game 2. We modify R0 in order to i. pre-sample all fresh
randomness using a random function Sample, ii. start by
computing internal observations, and output shares ci such
that i ∈ IO, iii. then compute output shares such that i /∈ IO.
We refer to this new function as R1 and we use EasyCrypt
to prove that R0 and R1 produce equivalent distributions
on the requested observations if their position sets are the
same set O such that |O| ≤ t and their input encodings
agree for each ai where i ∈ IO.
function R1(a,O) :
for i = 0 to t do for j = i+ 1 to t do ri,j ← Sample(i, j);
for i = 0 to t do if (ai ∈ O) then ai ← ai;
for i = 0 to t do
if (i ∈ IO) then
for j = 0 to t do
if (ri,j ∈ O) then ri,j ← ri,j ;
if (ci,j ∈ O) then ci,j ← SumCij(i, j);
if (ci ∈ O) then ci ← SumCij(i, t);
for i = 0 to t do
if (i /∈ IO ∧ ci ∈ O) then ci ← SumCij(i, t);
return c
function SumCij(i, j) :
s← ai;
for k = 0 to j do
if (i < k) then
s← s⊕ Sample(i, k);
elseif (i > k) then
s← s	 Sample(k, i);
return s;
Game 3. We now delay the generation of random val-
ues as much as possible, sampling just before their first
use. We refer to this new function as R2. We prove the
equivalence between Games 2 and 3 if the share the
same O such that |O| ≤ t and if they agree on input
shares ai such that i ∈ I . This equivalence leverages
a generic argument equating lazy and eager sampling
when independent from intermediate adversary views.
function R2(a,O) :
for i = 0 to t do if (ai ∈ O) then ai ← ai;
for i = 0 to t do
if (i ∈ IO) then
for j = 0 to d do
if (ri,j ∈ O) then ri,j ← Sample(i, j);
if (ci,j ∈ O) then ci,j ← SumCij(i, j);
if (ci ∈ O) then ci ← SumCij(i, t);
for i = 0 to d do
if (i /∈ IO ∧ ci ∈ O) then ci ← SumCij(i, t);
return c;
Game 4 In this final game, we fully simulate the computation of the ci when i /∈ IO by
showing that there exists a non-empty set of indices LO such that ∀` ∈ L, ri,` is not
assigned yet. Then, instead of computing the ci (for i /∈ I) as in Game 2:
∀` ∈ L, ri,` ← $; ci ← ai ⊕
i−1⊕
j=0
ri,j 	
t⊕
j=i+1
ri,j ,
we simulate it by setting the value of ri,k as follows:
ci ← $; ∀` ∈ L\{k}, ri,` ← $,
if (i < k), ri,k ← ci 	 ai 	
i−1⊕
j=0,j 6=k
ri,j ⊕
t⊕
j=i+1,j 6=k
ri,j ,
if (i > k), ri,k ← 	ci ⊕ ai ⊕
i−1⊕
j=0,j 6=k
ri,j 	
t⊕
j=i+1,j 6=k
ri,j .
We prove the equivalence between Game 3 and Game 4 with EasyCrypt when functions
R2 and R3 share the same O such that |O| ≤ t and agree on input shares ai with i ∈ I .
The most critical part of this step is undoubtedly to ensure that the subscript L contains
at least one index. To do so, we need to show that the elements ri,` with ` ∈ L were not
already used and won’t be reused anywhere. Finally, we also formally prove that the
results of R3, which represents the final simulator, only depends on those input shares
ai such that i ∈ IO for all O such that |O| ≤ t.
function SumCij(i, j) :
s← ai;
for k = 0 to j do
if (i < k) then s← s⊕ Sample(i, k);
else if (i > k) then s← s	 Sample(k, i);
return s;
function SetCi(i);
s← ai; k ← 0;
while ((k 6 t) ∧ ((i == k) ∨ (k < i ∧ ((i, k) ∈ dom r))∨
(i < k ∧ ((k, i) ∈ dom r))) do
if (i < k) then s← s⊕ ri,k;
else if (i > k) then s← s	 ri,k;
k ← k + 1;
k′ ← k; r′ ← $;
for k = k′ to t do s← s⊕ ri,k;
if (i < k′) then ri,k′ ← s⊕ r′; else rk′,i ← s	 r′;
return r′;
function R3(a,O) :
for i = 0 to t do if (ai ∈ O) then ai ← ai;
for i = 0 to t; i ∈ IO do
for j = 0 to t do
if (ri,j ∈ O) then ri,j ← Sample(i, j);
if (ci,j ∈ O) then ci,j ← SumCij(i, j);
if (ci ∈ O) then ci ← SetCi(i);
for i = 0 to t; i /∈ IO do
if (ci ∈ O) then ci ← SetCi(i);
return c;
Finally, we have formally proved that an adversary could not distinguish between
two programs which share the same inputs {ai}i∈I with at most t observations and that
the cardinal of I was upper bounded by the number of internal observations d1.
Secure Multiplication (Prop. 2) We now give an informal proof sketch that Gadget 7
is t-SNI for all t. The proof is formalized in EasyCrypt following the model described
above for Proposition 1.
Proof (sketch for Proposition 2). Let O be a set of observations such that |O| ≤ t, and
let d1 = |Oint| and d2 = |Oext|. Note that d1 + d2 ≤ t. To prove t-SNI, we aim to find
an input set I such that ‖I‖ ≤ d1, and to construct a perfect simulator that uses only
input shares from I to compute the same distribution over the observations O as the real
gadget.
First, we identify which variables are internals and which are outputs. We directly
split the internals in four groups for the needs of the proof:
1. the ai, the bi, and the ai ⊗ bi,
2. the ci,j (resp. cj,i) which correspond to the value of the variable ci (resp. cj) at
iteration i, j,
3. the ri,j (the value of r on line 5i,j), and the rj,i (the value of r on line 8i,j),
4. the ai ⊗ bj and the ai ⊗ bj 	 ri,j .
The output variables are the final values of ci (that is ci,t).
We construct I. As the algorithm takes two inputs a and b, we define two sets of
indices I, J ( {0, . . . , t} such that I =
{
ai | i ∈ I
}
∪
{
bi | i ∈ J
}
. It is then sufficient
to show that they are such that |I|, |J | ≤ |Oint|, and that the gadget is (I,O)-NI. For
each observation in the first or the second group, we add the index i to both I and J . For
each observation in the third or in the fourth group: if the index i is already in I , we add
the index j to I , otherwise we add the index i to I and similarly for J . It is clear that the
final sets I and J contain each one at most d1 indices, since each internal observation
adds at most one index to each of them.
We now construct the simulator. For clarity, observe that the SecMult algorithm can
be equivalently represented using the following matrix.
a0 ⊗ b0 0 r0,1 r0,2 · · · r0,t
a1 ⊗ b1 r1,0 0 r1,2 · · · r1,t
a2 ⊗ b2 r2,0 r2,1 0 · · · r2,t
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
at ⊗ bt rt,0 rt,1 rt,2 · · · 0
 .
In this setting, ci,j corresponds to the partial sum of the j +2 first elements of line i. For
each variable ri,j (i < j) entering in the computation of an observation, we assign it a
fresh random value. Then, for each observation in the first group, ai and bi are provided
to the simulator (by definition of I and J) thus the observation is perfectly simulated.
For an observation in the third group, we distinguish two cases. If i < j, ri,j is already
assigned to a fresh random value. If i > j, either (i, j) ∈ I × J and the observation is
perfectly simulated from rj,i, ai, bi, aj and bj or rj,i does not enter in the computation of
any internal variable that was observed and ri,j (line 5i,j) was assigned a fresh random
value. Each observation made in the fourth group is perfectly simulated using ri,j , ai
and bj . As for an observation in the second group, the corresponding variable is a partial
sum composed of a product ai ⊗ bi and of variables ri,j . Since ai and bi are provided
to the simulator in this case, we focus on each remaining ri,j . Each one of them such
that i < j is already assigned to a fresh random value. For the others, if rj,i enters in the
computation of any other internal observation, then (i, j) ∈ I × J and ri,j is simulated
with rj,i, ai, bi, aj and bj . Otherwise, ri,j is assigned a fresh random value.
We still have to simulate output observations. We start with those for which an
intermediate sum (group 2) is also observed. For each such variable ci, the biggest partial
sum which is observed is already simulated. Thus, we consider the remaining terms
ri,j . Each one of them such that i < j is already assigned to a fresh random value. For
the others, either (i, j) ∈ I × J and ci is perfectly simulated from rj,i, ai, bi, aj and
bj or rj,i does not enter in the computation of any internal variable observed and ci is
assigned a fresh random value. We now consider output observations ci for which none
of the partial sums are observed. Each of them contains t random variables of the form
ri,j , at most one of which can enter in the computation of each one of the cj with i 6= j.
Since we already considered at most t− 1 observations not counting the current one, at
least one of the ri,j we need to consider does not enter in the computation of any other
observed variable and is unassigned. Thus, we can simulate ci using a fresh random
value.
D Robust Composition
We consider the problem of securely composing algorithms or gadgets when the adver-
sary may place t probes in each of them, capturing security in the region and stateful
probing models [24]. In this informal discussion, we forbid wire duplications between
regions (that is, each region’s output can only be used once as input to another region).
However, the same principles that allow us to compositional reason about security in
the simple probing model would allow us to reason about robust composition with wire
duplication, using, in particular, 2t-SNI mask refreshing gadgets where necessary.
As noted in Section 9, it is clear that any number of 2t-SNI gadgets or algorithms
can be securely composed in this setting. We first observe that, for any two 2t-SNI
algorithms F and G, and for any OF and OG such that |OF |, |OG| ≤ t, we have
‖depsetF ;G(OF ∪ OF )‖ ≤ t. This allows us to conclude about the security of the
composition of any number of gadgets by induction on that number.
This observation provides an elegant justification to Coron’s result [12], which states
that iterating RefreshA2t+1 2t+ 1 times allows the secure stateful composition of his
masked table-lookup algorithms without further doubling the number of shares. Indeed,
it is also easy to see that Coron’s mask refreshing algorithm is 2t-SNI.
However, the same composition could be obtained by slightly relaxing the security
requirement on F and G. Indeed, we could instead use the following condition, which
we call robust non-interference.
Definition 9 (Robust Non-Interference) A gadgetG is t-robustly non-interfering (or t-
RNI) whenever, for anyOG such that |OG| ≤ 2t and |OintG | ≤ t, we have ‖depsetG(OG)‖ ≤
|OintG |.
The same argument that allows us to securely and robustly compose 2t-SNI gadgets
allows us to securely and robustly compose t-RNI gadgets. Intuitively, t-RNI allows the
adversary to place 2t probes on the gadget, as long as at most t of them are internal. This
captures exactly the scenario where an adversary can place t probes inside a region, and
can also learn, by probing subsequent regions, information about t shares of the output.
Constructing RNI Algorithms We now show how any t-NI algorithm can be turned into
a t-RNI algorithm without doubling its internal number of shares, simply by processing
its inputs and output. To do so, we consider the Double and Half gadgets (Gadget 13).14
Gadget 13 The Double and Half gadgets
function Doublet(a : Kt+1)
for i = 0 to t do
r2i
$← K
r2i+1 ← ai 	 r2i
return 〈r0, . . . , r2t+1〉
(13a) Doubling the number of shares
function Halft(a : K2t+2)
for i = 0 to t do
ri
$← a2i ⊕ a2i+1
return 〈r0, . . . , rt〉
(13b) Halving the number of shares
We first note that Doublet is t-NI, and that Halft is such that, for any OH such that
|OH| ≤ t, we have ‖depsetH(OH)‖ ≤ 2t. (Indeed, each internal position depends two
shares of the input.)
14 These are only gadgets for a slightly extended notion of gadget that allows the encoding size to
change between inputs and outputs.
Alg. 14 Making a t-NI gadget t-RNI
function RobustG(a1, . . . ,an ∈ K2t+2)
for i = 1 to n do
ai := RefreshM2t+1(ai)
xi := Halft(ai)
y := G(x1, . . . ,xn)
r := Double(y)
r := RefreshM2t+1(r)
Lemma 6 Given a t-NI gadget G, the algorithm shown in Alg. 14 is t-RNI.
Proof. The proof is by composition, leveraging the following facts (for some O as
assumed by t-RNI): i. RefreshM2t+1 is t-SNI (so the dependency set of its position set
is of degree at most |OR2 | ≤ t; ii. Doublet is t-NI (so the dependency set of its position
set is of degree at most |OD|+ |OM2 | ≤ t); iii. G is t-NI (so the dependency set of its
position set and output set is of degree at most |OG|+ |OD|+ |OR2 | ≤ t); iv. Halft has
the property described above (so the dependency set of its position set and output set is
of degree at most 2(|OH|+ |OG|+ |OD|+ |OR2 |) ≤ 2t); v. RefreshM2t+1 is 2t-SNI (so
the dependency set of its position set and output set if of degree at most |OR1 | ≤ |Oint|).
E Privacy vs probing security
In this appendix, we exhibit a simple example that separates Ishai, Sahai and Wagner’s
notion of privacy [24] and the widely used simulation-based notion of t-probing security.
We recall that Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24] define privacy for a masked circuit C as
the fact that any t wires in C during an execution of O ◦ C ◦ I (where I and O are
the encoding and decoding circuits that sample uniform encodings of the secret inputs
and recombine outputs from their encodings, away from adversary interference) can be
simulated without access to any wire in the circuit.15 On the other hand, as discussed
earlier in the paper, t-probing security, as defined for example by Carlet et al. [10] states
that a gadget or algorithm G is t-probing secure iff any t of its intermediate wires can be
simulated using at most t shares of each of its inputs.
Note in particular that, unlike privacy, t-probing security makes no mention of secrets,
or of uniform input encodings. In Gadget 15, we exhibit a small example gadget, which
computes a  (a ⊕ b for t = 2, and shows that this is indeed an important detail by
separating the two notions. However, we note that even Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [24]
prove that their transformers are private using a t-probing style simulation argument, so
the separation we exhibit here makes little difference in practice.
15 More accurately, they define privacy for a circuit transformer that includes definitions for I and
O. This is not relevant here.
Gadget 15 A small separating example
1: function separator(a,b : K3)
2: for i = 0 to 2 do
3: ri := ai ⊕ bi
4: for i = 0 to 2 do
5: ci ← ai  ri
6: for i = 0 to 2 do
7: for j = i+ 1 to 2 do
8: r $← K
9: ci ← ci 	 r
10: t← ai  rj
11: r ← r ⊕ t
12: t← aj  ri
13: r ← r⊕ t
14: cj ← cj ⊕ r
15: return c
It is easy to see (and it can be checked automatically using, for example, Barthe et
al.’s tool [4]) that this small algorithm is private for t = 2. Intuitively, this is because,
since privacy requires simulation only when the input encodings are known to be uniform,
and even though the inputs to SecMult are not independent, one of them is essentially a
one-time-pad of the other.
However, simulating, say, lines 100,1 (with value a0  (a1 ⊕ b1)) and 101,2 (with
value a1  (a2 ⊕ b2)) using only two shares of each of a and b is not possible.
We note that, as pointed out above, the tool by Barthe et al. [4] directly verify privacy,
rather than going through t-NI and losing precision. However, they do not scale. When
considering verification tools (or indeed even the verifiability of pen-and-paper proofs),
there is therefore a tradeoff between precision and applicability.
